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II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

The Code of Judicial Administration was complied with in the present case.

2.

An attorney has an independent duty of care that is owed to third parties that

is separate and apart from the duty owed to a client.
3.

An attorney in the furtherance of the client's lawful interest cannot engage in

conduct which amounts to abuse of process.
4.

The attorney's conduct and culpability is not subject to the defense ofprivilege.

5.

A statutory cause of action, under the facts of this case, is not subject to the

defense of "mootness".
6.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel, as asserted by the Appellee, does not apply

in this case.
7.

A Lis Pendens, relating to a specific piece of property to be valid, requires the

institution of a legal proceeding in a local court.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Introduction to the Reply Brief.
The Appellant will respond to the Appellee's Brief in the order in which the issues
raised are presented.
B. Rule 4.501 of the Code of Judicial Administration
was Complied with in the District Court Proceedings.
The Appellee maintains that the Appellant failed to comply with Rule 4.501(2) of the
Code of Judicial Administration with respect to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
-1-

This procedural Rule provides that a party, against whom a Motion for Summary Judgment
has been made, is required to point out to the court the existence of any disputed facts. In
this case, it was the Appellant who moved for a partial summary judgment on a portion of
the complaint. (Record pp. 51 to 54). (Addendum No. 10, at p. 44). Therefore, under the
rule, it was the duty of the Appellee (and not the moving party) to point out to the District
Court the existence of any material disputed facts. Rainford v. Rytting 22 Ut.2d 252, 451
P.2d 769 (Utah 1969); Bill Brown Realty v. Abbott 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977).
The critical issue in a summary judgment proceeding is the existence of material and
disputed facts. In this case, the core material facts are not in dispute even though there are
many collateral facts which are hotly contested. For example, the Appellant claimed sole
legal and beneficial title to the home and that it was his sole and separate property. (Winters
Aff. If 10, 11, and 12). (Record p.216). (Addendum No. 11, pp. 40 to 50). Ms. Abizaid
claimed she had a community property interest in the home. (Record p. 154). (Addendum
No. 13, pp. 78 & 79). The resolution of this factual dispute is not necessary in order to
ascertain if the complaint fails to state a cause of action, whether the use of the lis pendens
in this case was improper or if the claims are moot.
The facts as asserted by each party must be such that they are admissible as evidence
at the time of the trial. Winter v. Northwest Pipeline 820 P.2d 916 (Utah 1991). The
Appellant's Affidavit meets this evidentiary requirement.
The Appellee, in their Response Brief to the Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary
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Judgment, identified the disputed facts. (Record pp. 320 to 324). The court's duty,
thereafter, was to review the records to determine what are the material facts necessary to
resolve the case, and then determine whether or not the facts are sufficiently disputed or
undisputed to justify the entry of summary judgment (as to either party) and finally,
determine if the moving party is legally entitled to the relief being sought. The District
Court's ruling did not strike any pleadings as a result of any alleged failure to comply with
the Code of Judicial Administration. (Record pp. 392 to 394). (Addendum No. 22, at p.
183). The purpose of the rule was met.
The facts, as alleged by the Plaintiff in his supporting affidavits, along with all
reasonable interference fairly drawn therefrom, must be considered in a light most favorable
to the Appellant. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel 123 Ut. 289, 259 P.2d 297 (Utah 1953).
C. The Trial Court Failed to Acknowledge
That Attorney Schulman had an Independent
Duty of Care Owed to the Plaintiff.
The trial court held as a matter of law that no duty of care is owed to the appellant by
the attorney. (Record p. 244). (Addendum No. 22, p. 95).
The duty of care that arises out in this case is the result of positive law. This duty
exists under the common law (i.e. the duty not to abuse legal process) and by reason of the
state statute dealing with the recording of documents. See also California Civil Code
§1714(a). This is not a case where there is an attorney/client relationship between the
parties. The case law, cited by the Appellee, to the extent they arise as a result of the
-3-

attorney/client relationship, are not relevant to this case. Even under California Law, the
Defendant owes a duty of reasonable care to third parties. See for example, California
Business and Professions Code §6068(c), (d), and (g). The policy of the law is to broaden
and strengthen the duty of lawyers to third parties. Ken Roberts v. Bell Hunt, Hunt &
Brown 57 Cal.App.3d 104 (Cali. App. 1976); Kerry Sorenson v. State Bar of California 804
P.2d 44 (Cali. 1991). Prior case law cited by the Appellee suggests that there is absolutely
no duty owed to a third party by a lawyer is not on point. A lawyer's professional
responsibility acknowledges that there is a duty that is owed to third parties which is separate
and apart from the duty owed to a client. California Business of Professions Code §6068.
The duty of the lawyer is not to use legal process for an improper purpose or goal.
D. The Plaintiff has Established All of the Modern
Elements of a Cause of Action for Abuse of Process.
Abuse of process arises where legal process is used in order to prevent a party from
disposing of real property. 1 Am. Jur.2d Abuse of Process, §13. The validity of the issuance
of the process is not material. It is the improper use of the legal process that is important in
determining if the tort is present. This critical inquiry over the proper use of the legal process
will help maintain the honor and the integrity of the judicial system. Upholding the judicial
system is a basic obligation of every lawyer in every state of this nation.
Abuse of process is the use of legal process to accomplish a purpose for which the
process in not intended. 1 Am. Jur.2d Abuse of Process, § 1. Paul J. Donohue v. Honorable
C.L. Burd 722 F.Supp 1507 (DC SD Ohio 1989). The law can and should hold accountable
-4-

any person who "... knowingly participates in its use..." for a purpose not permitted under
the law. 1 Am.Jur.2d Abuse of Process, § 18. This rule ofjoint culpability has been applied
to a lawyer who sought out the issuance of legal process for improper leverage. Paul J.
Donohue v. Honorable C.L. Burd 722 F.Supp 1507 (DC SD Ohio 1989); Helen H. Little v.
Clarence Sowers 1667 Kan. 72, 204 P.2d 605 (Kan. 1949).
It is undisputed that each person involved in a wrongful act is jointly responsible for
all damages arising from the wrong, regardless of whether or not he was a direct participant
in the activity. Allen Greenwood v. Leon Mooradian 290 P.2d 955 (Cali. App. 1955).
The District Court ruled as a matter of law that there is lacking one or more of the
basic elements of a cause of action for abuse of process. (Record pp. 392 & 393).
(Addendum No. 22, pp. 183 and 184). The Appellees, in their brief, have concentrated on
the last element of the cause of action. This element (which is not required in all cases and
in all jurisdictions) requires that the claimant must have been a successful party in a prior
action. What is served by this requirement? The claimant must have been successful as to
what? The central issue in this case is the appropriate use of a Notice of Lis Pendens. The
prior litigation in the state of California represents a successful court action in which the
California Superior Court ordered the immediate release of the Lis Pendens. (Record pp.
152 to 157). (Abizaid Aff. ^ 1 2 to 20). (Addendum No. 16 & 17, pp. 90 to 92). The
element of a successful prior proceeding is intended to establish that the legal process (i.e.
the Lis Pendens) was addressed by the court. This judicial review of the proper use of the
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Lis Pendens did in fact occur in this case as acknowledged by Ms. Schulman in her Affidavit.
(Record p. 246). (Addendum No. 21, at p. 107, ^}9). The Appellant was successful in a
different court proceeding and this occurred prior to the dismissal of the complaint. (Record
pp. 145 to 148). (Addendum No. 16 and 17, pp. 90 & 91).
The claim of abuse of process in more modern times no longer requires (as an element
of the cause of action) that a prior action involving the process be resolved in favor of the
claimant inasmuch that the tort action arises when the abuse occurs and not when the other
action is terminated. 1 Am.Jur.2d Abuse of Process, §10. Paul J. Donohue v. Honorable
C.L. Burd 722 F.Supp 1507 (DC SD Ohio 1989). This modern rule of law allows the court
to redress all wrongs which may come before it. A meritorious claim (which the court may
eventually sustain) should not be a means to allow the prevailing party to achieve the
favorable results in an illegal manner. The modern trend is to prevent the abuse of any legal
process regardless of the merits of the underlying claim.
The Appellee claims the defense of privilege. (Record pp. 316 & 317). (Addendum
No. 14, p. 83). This claim is not found in her Answer.
The claim that the attorney is entitled to some protection as to any conduct, even in
maintaining an unfounded claim, exists only as long as the attorney was attempting a proper
adjudication of the underlying claim. Warner v. Roadshow Attractions 132 P.2d 35 (Cali.
App. 1943). This is not an absolute defense of any and all conduct. This defense of privilege
rests on a factual determination that a proper suit was ongoing and that the actions in
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question were part of a proper adjudication of the claim. No suit was pending when the Lis
Pendens was filed. No suit was filed shortly thereafter. This defense of necessity allows an
inquiry into the bona fideness of the acts and the intent of the actor. The issue of good faith
is a question of fact. The courts have stated that"... the testimony of the attorney's involved
is not conclusive on the question." Warner v. Roadshow Attractions 132 P.2d 35 (Cali. App.
1943).
If the client's objectives can be achieved through established legal means (i.e. a
personal restraining order of the type eventually issued), then the use of a Lis Pendens by Ms.
Schulman raises real significant questions of intent, purpose, and motive.
The evidence in this case is clear that the Lis Pendens was attempting to assert a claim
that was materially different in its scope and consequences than a basic creditor's claim. Ms.
Abizaid, in her Affidavit, made it clear that all she wanted or desired was money. The actual
legal claim that was eventually asserted by the Appellee in the California Superior Court was
nothing more than a generic creditor's claim arising out of a Decree of Divorce. At no time
was there a bona fide attempt to adjudicate title to the home. At no time did she assert a right
of possession to the home. No challenge to the quit claim deed was ever made, in any court,
at any time. Therefore, the evidence is clear (including all reasonable inferences from the
facts as established) that there was an improper use of a legal process to obtain a tactical
advantage that the law does not allow. Paul J. Donohue v. Honorable C.L. Burd 722 F.Supp
1507 (DC SD Ohio 1989).
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The end never justifies the means. This is the substance of the tort of abuse of
process. All of the necessary elements of a prima facie case were established. The District
Court erred in dismissing this cause of action.
E. The Appellant's Claims Were Not Moot as a
Result of the Court Ordered Release of the Lis Pendens.
An issue is moot when it amounts to nothing more than an academic exercise or the
issuance of an advisory opinion by the Court.
The Appellee makes a claim and the trial court adopted the proposition that the
Superior Court ordered release of the Lis Pendens has mooted all of the issues in this case.
The statutory cause of action is not terminated by the eventual release of the Lis Pendens.
The law requires this act at the very minimum. The cause of action ripened after the twenty
(20) day period had expired. The statute does not contain any language that suggests that the
eventual compliance with the law, about five (5) months after the fact, "moots11 the statutory
claim. Such a holding would render the statute ineffective as a remedial measure.
The eventual release of the Lis Pendens only goes to the nature and the extent of the
damages and not to the existence of a cause of action. The release of the Lis Pendens does
not mean the balance of the case is a waste of judicial resources. To the contrary, this case
raises very significant legal issues involving the proper use of a Notice of Lis Pendens.
The eventual use of appropriate legal process (such as a person restraining order in
a domestic law case) does not justify the prior actions of the party. The abuse of process
claim arose when the Lis Pendens was recorded. The eventual release of the Lis Pendens
-8-'

goes to the issue of damages under the statutory cause of action but it does not turn the case
into an academic exercise.
F. The Appellee Cannot Assert on Appeal
the Issue of Privilege and Collateral Estoppel
Since they were Not Plead in the Answer.
The very purpose of the Appellant's Motion before the Third District Court was to
strike all of the defenses asserted by the Appellee in her Answer. (Record pp. 51 to 54).
(Addendum No. 10, at p. 44). In the face of this motion, they are not entitled to raise or
assert defenses that were not otherwise appropriately plead in the Answer. Valley Bank v.
Wilken 66 P.2d 493 (Utah 1983). The Answer lists only the following major defenses.
(Record pp. 35 to 42). (Addendum No. 9, pp. 36 to 43).
1.

Failure to state a cause of action.

2.

Estoppel by reason of the Plaintiffs own conduct.

3.

Laches and the statute of limitation though no statute is cited.

4.

Waiver.

5.

Unclean hands.

6.

Lack of proximate cause for any damage.

7.

The claim for abuse of process is not ripe.

8.

Lack of personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.

These enumerated defenses should have been stricken. The defense of "privilege" and
"mootness" are not plead in the Answer. These listed defenses are not shown to exist in the
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supporting Affidavits of the named Defendants.
Even assuming that the issue of privilege was properly before the District Court, the
necessary elements of the claim of privilege are missing or at the least subject to a dispute
of a material fact.
It is clear that the Lis Pendens, prepared and recorded by the Appellee, was not made
during the pendency or during the course of any judicial proceedings. The Appellee, by her
own admissions, indicates that the first judicial proceeding regarding the dispute (whether
it was a money dispute or a marital property dispute) was instituted in the California Superior
Court on the 15th day of October, 1995. Therefore, the words, representations, and actions
involving the Lis Pendens are not an act or statement made during or in the course of any
judicial proceeding. The defense of privilege only applies to words or conduct that
reasonably relate to an ongoing judicial proceeding. More importantly, the recorded Lis
Pendens did not in any way relate to the actual claims that were eventually asserted in the
California Superior Court. (Schulman Aff. Exhibit "E"). (Addendum No. 15, pp. 85 to 89).
The evidence is clear that the actual claims that were asserted were generic creditor's claims
arising out of the Decree of Divorce. At no time was there asserted a right to the physical
possession of the property or a right to the legal title to the property. The Lis Pendens was
filed in order to put financial pressure upon the ex-spouse in the hopes of compelling the
settlement of the monetary dispute that had been ongoing over a number of years. This
monetary dispute between the parties was not part of any existing legal proceeding.
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The filing of a Lis Pendens does not revive a divorce proceeding that had otherwise
become final under state law. (Record pp. 259 to 262). (Addendum No. 6, pp. 27 to 29).
Even assuming that the Utah home was actually acquired with community funds, the
Appellee did not comply with the provisions of California Family Code §2556. She did not
file a post judgment motion or a post judgment order to show cause asserting a specific claim
to the property. The only thing that Ms. Schulman did was record a Notice of Lis Pendens.
She did nothing to follow up on the matter. She forced the Plaintiff to act. When she finally
did proceed to the merits of her client's claim, it was limited to a claim for money due under
the 1989 Decree of Divorce.
The Appellee's make a claim that the California Court ultimately agreed that the
Defendant Allison Abizaid had an "interest" of any type in the property. There was nothing
in the record that indicates that such fact was proven. The Superior Court's records are to
the contrary and they all indicate that after hearing argument on the matter, the court ordered
the Lis Pendens released. (Record pp. 145 to 148). (Addendum No. 16 and 17). Because
of the settlement between the former spouses, the actual merits of Ms. Abizaid's asserted
money claim was never reached by the court. The only issues that were actually ruled upon
by the California Superior Court was the recording of the Lis Pendens and the necessity of
releasing the Lis Pendens. The Superior Court did want to maintain the status quo and it did
so through the entry of a personal restraining order. The entry of a temporary restraining
order in a domestic dispute to preserve the status quo does not come anywhere close to
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adjudicating the merits of any claim of community property. Such an order is far different
than the Lis Pendens filed in this case.
G. The Claim of Collateral Estoppel bv Appellee
is not Available to Them in the Present Action.
The Appellee motion to the Third District Court claims that the issues of the Lis
Pendens have been adjudicated. (Record pp. 316 & 317). (Addendum No. 14, p. 83).
The basic elements of collateral estoppel have not been met in this case as to the
adjudication of the merits of Ms. Abizaid's claims for money. In contrast, the court did reach
the merits of the issued and recorded Lis Pendens, but that was all that was decided in the
case. The Lis Pendens' ruling was in favor of the Appellant.
The elements of the collateral estoppel are as follows:
1.

The legal and factual issues are the same.

2.

The issues have been fully and vigorously litigated.

3.

The issues must have been necessary to support the judgment entered.

4.

No special circumstances are present that make the doctrine inapplicable.

Collateral estoppel applies only to issues actually raised and actually decided by the
court. International Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979). In this context, the
primary inquiry is into the actual issues raised at the time of the trial.
In applying the doctrine, there must be a prior adjudication of a controversy by a court
of competent jurisdiction. International Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979).
For the judgment to be valid and thus invoke the application of the doctrine, it need
-12-

not be free from legal error. Copper State v. Bruno 735 P.2d 387 (Ut.App. 1987). However,
the court must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in order for the
judgement to be binding. International Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979).
Res judicata does not apply unless there is a decision on the merits of the case. The
same rule applies to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Wilde v. Mid-Century 635 P.2d 417
(Utah 1981). This same rule of law applies in federal courts. For example, once the
propriety of a tax deduction, credit or other issue is actually decided for a given taxable year,
the same tax application applies to other subsequent years involving the very same factual
matter. USA v. International Building Co. 53-1 USTC |9366,345 US 502,73 S.Ct. 807,97
L.Ed 1182 (1953): Russell v. Commissioner 82-2 USTC ^9429.678 F.2d 782 (CA-9 1982).
Since the California Superior Court proceedings were terminated as the result of a
settlement, the merits of the money dispute was not actually tried to the court and therefore,
there was no adjudication on the merits of Ms. Abizaid's claim for money. The settlement
did not establish a community interest in the home.
The California law provided a good and adequate legal remedy to Ms. Abizaid. The
fact that her attorney was not satisfied with the remedy that was available to her raises issues
of spite and improper purpose.
The issuance of a personal restraining order under the California Family Code is not
disputed. In fact, it was the appropriate remedy that should have been used. The restraining
order can apply to both community property, quasi community property, and to the separate
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assets of the parties. California Family Code §2045. This is similar to Utah law which
routinely authorizes the use of a personal restraining order in domestic cases without the
usual safeguards. Rule 65A(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the
underlying merits of the Defendant's claim could not have been adjudicated by the simple
judicial act of entering a personal restraining order necessary to maintain the status quo. It
should be noted that even under California law, the issuance of a restraining order required
the "pendency" of a case on which to support the order.
H. Collateral Estoppel Bars a Party From
Asserting a Different Position in a Subsequent Suit.
Collateral estoppel is different from the doctrine of res judicata. The rule provides
that when an "issue" has been adjudicated against a person in a prior proceeding, he should
be estoppel from adjudicating the same issue again. Richards v. Hodson 26 Ut.2d 113,485
P.2d 1044 (Utah 1971). The doctrine can be applied by a person who was not a party to the
litigation when the other person seeks to assert a different position in a second suit.
International Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979); Lawlor v. National 349 US
322, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955). The legal doctrine only applies to issues that were
actually raised and actually litigated on the merits in the prior proceeding. International
Resources v. Dunfield 599 P.2d 515 (Utah 1979).
Collateral estoppel does not depend on what the specific claims for relief were or what
the cause of action was actually asserted. Rather, it operates when: (i) a factual issue is
actually raised; (ii) the issue was essential to a resolution of the prior case; and (iii) the prior
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issue is the same issue now raised in a second suit. Robertson v. Campbell 674 P.2d 1226
(Utah 1983). A fourth element requires that the issue was folly, fairly, and completely
litigated. Baxter v. Utah 705 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1985). See also Copper State v. Bruno 735
P.2d 387 (Utah App. 1987).
Collateral estoppel usually arises out of a different cause of action and is invoked to
prevent a party to the first litigation from asserting a position which is different in the second
case. Searle Bros, v. Searle 588 P.2d 689 (Utah 1978). In the Searle case, the Court said the
doctrine also applies to an assignee or privy of the party. A privy party is one who, while not
a named party, had control over the litigation in the prior suit. Baxter v. Utah 705 P.2d 1167
(Utah 1985). This is the present case. The legal issues framed and asserted were those
espoused and directed by Ms. Schulman.
Utah has abandoned the requirement of mutuality of the parties. Robertson v.
Campbell 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983); Neilson v. Droubav 642 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1982). In
essence, the Neilson Court states that a stranger to the Judgment can invoke the decision on
the issue as against a party who was involved in the prior litigation and for which a Judgment
was actually rendered. However, the Neilson Court said the opposite is not true. The
doctrine can not be invoked against a non-party. Ruffinengo v. Miller 579 P.2d 342 (Utah
1978); State v. Parker 13 Ut.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (Utah 1962).
Collateral estoppel is sometimes referred to as issue preclusion. However, no
distinction exists as between the issues of law or issues of equity. Robertson v. Campbell
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674 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1983).
The Appellee is asserting a position that is inconsistent with the position taken before
the California Superior Court. The actual position taken in California was a basic creditor's
claim. There was no claim made against the title to the home. In order to justify the use of
the Lis Pendens, she now claims that her client was asserting a "community property" claim.
In this case, the issue of the proper use of the Lis Pendens was adjudicated and the
court ordered that the Lis Pendens be released. This ruling was on the merits.
I. The Entry of Summary Judgment
is Proper Before the Court on Appeal.
The issues of summary judgment are properly before the court on this appeal. The
order itself is the matter that is subject to review. It provided that it is a final order on each
of the Plaintiffs claims against Ms. Schulman. No additional citations to the record are
jurisdictionally necessary in order to prosecute the appeal or preserve the issue raised in the
pleadings on appeal.
The specific relief that the Plaintiff was seeking before the District Court was as set
forth in the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Record pp. 51 to 54). (Addendum No.
10 pp., 44 to 47).
The mere fact that the court denies the relief does not mean that the issue has not been
preserved for appeal. Rule 46 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In any event, the motion
to strike the defenses of the Defendant are clearly directed at those issues raised in the
present appeal to sustain the order of dismissal.
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The issues raised in District Court are those as asserted in the Plaintiffs motion
(Record pp. 51 to 54). (Addendum No. 10, p.44). and the cross motion of the Defendant
seeking dismissal of all cause of actions. (Record pp. 316 to 318). (Addendum No. 14, p
82).
The court, in order to grant the Defendant's motion, must find that a prima facie case
has not been shown as to each cause of action.
The District Court granted the Defendant's motion for the reason stated in the order.
(Record pp. 392 to 394). (Addendum No. 22, p 183).
J. The Use of a Lis Pendens Must Be Subject
to a Local Proceeding and is Statutorily Mandated.
It is clear that when a Lis Pendens is recorded on real property physically located in
the state of Utah, the recording must be supported by a then pending action in a court that has
jurisdiction to hear the proceeding. The Notice of Lis Pendens was filed on May 30, 1998.
No civil proceeding of any type in any court was commenced to adjudicate what was alleged
in the Lis Pendens. In fact, no such action was ever filed, at any time, in the state of Utah.
The law requiring an action of some type is contained in UCA 78-13-1.
The action that was eventually filed in the California Superior Court was to enforce
the Decree of Divorce and not to assert a "community property" interest of any type in the
Utah real property. This enforcement motion was filed on October 15th, 1995. This motion
was filed only after the threats of legal action were made by the Appellant. The specific
relief that was then sought in the California Superior Court was a money judgment and not
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title to the property or the right to physical possession of the same. No claim to setaside the
deed was made. No ruling was sought that the property was in fact community property. As
a result, the only proper place to assert a specific interest in the proper was in the state of
Utah. The property was acquired after the divorce was entered. The Appellant was a Utah
citizen at the time of the purchase. The Quit Claim Deed conveyed whatever interest Ms.
Abizaid had to the property.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Summary Judgment in favor of the Appellee should be reversed.
The Appellant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to statutory liability should
have been granted and the asserted Defenses of Ms. Schulman should have been stricken.
The District Court should be reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for
a trial or other appropriate proceedings.
Respectfully Submitted.
DATED this 27th day of November, 1998.

^JACKSO;
STV*/—

-18-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered in person (or caused to be delivered) a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to the following:
David Berry, Esq.
BERTCH & BIRCH
5296 South Commerce Drive, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
David C. Wright, Esq.
Ellen Maycock, Esq.
50 West 300 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
by delivery to the law offices at the parties as shown above, dated the 27th day of November,
1998.

8/WINT-RLY.BRF

-19-

APPENDIX
A.
California Civil Code § 1714(a), Responsibility for willful acts and negligence;
contributory negligence.
(a) Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an
injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his
property or person, except so far as the latter has, willfully or by want of ordinary care,
brought the injury upon himself. The extent of liability in such cases is defined by the Title
on Compensatory Relief.
B.

California Business and Professions Code §6068, Duties of attorney.
It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following:
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions, proceedings, or defenses only as appear to
him or her legal or just, except the defense of a person charged with a public offense.
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him or her such
means only as are consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead the judge or any
judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding from any corrupt motive of passion or interest.

C.
California Family Code §2556, Community property or debts; continuing
jurisdiction.
In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of marriage, or for legal
separation of the parties, the court has continuing jurisdiction to award community estate
assets or community estate liabilities to the parties that have not been previously adjudicated
by a judgment in the proceeding. A party may file a postjudgment motion or order to show
cause in the proceeding in order to obtain adjudication of any community estate asset or
liability omitted or not adjudicated by the judgment. In these cases, the court shall equally
divide the omitted or unadjudicated community estate asset or liability, unless the court finds
upon good cause shown that the interests of justice require an unequal division of the asset
or liability.
D.

California Family Code §2045, Ex parte protective orders.

During the pendency of the proceeding, on application of a party in the manner
provided by Part 4 (commencing with Section 240) of Division 2, the court may issue ex
parte any of the following orders:
(a) An order restraining any person from transferring, encumbering, hypothecating,
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concealing, or in any way disposing of any property, real or personal, whether
community, quasi-community, or separate, except in the usual course of business or
for the necessities of life, and if the order is directed against a party, requiring that
party to notify the other party of any proposed extraordinary expenditures and to
account to the court for all extraordinary expenditures.
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